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IN DEFENSE OF A NARROW PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL RULE
Thomas L. Cluff, Jr
"[P]ublic policy is 'a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you
never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is
never argued at all but when other points fail."' 1
Sitting in my employment law class, I watched as my fellow law students' jaws
dropped to the ground, and faces swelled with righteous indignation as my pro-
fessor explained the employment at will rule. The aspect of the rule causing this
reaction was an employer's right to terminate an employment relationship for no
reason or for a bad reason. "Wait a minute," a student blurted out, "an employee
can be fired for a bad reason?" Well, as we soon discovered during the course of
that semester, there are plenty of "bad reasons" for which an employer cannot
terminate an employee. But these reasons are either contractually or statutorily
specific (e.g. race) and have failed to satisfy, not only many students, but also
judges, professors, and lawyers who are desirous of changing the common law
rule of at-will employment so as to eliminate an employer's right to fire for a
"bad reason. "
In this quest to eliminate any "bad reason" as a firing rationale, many employ-
ment law observers have saddled up on the "very unruly horse" called the Public
Policy Exception. The goal of those advocating this exception is to create a
cause of action for employees who are terminated for reasons that contravene the
state's public policy. Simply put, this is anything which "concerns what is right
and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively."2 While many
divergent views exist on the continued use of the employment at will doctrine in
its current form, few support an employer's right to freely discharge an employee
because that employee refuses to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, an activ-
ity which injures the general public. Consequently, the addition of a public poli-
cy exception has almost unanimous support among employment law commenta-
tors and growing support in the state courts.3 However, this consensus stops
1. JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 98, at 508 & n.19 (3d ed. 1990) (quoting Richardson v.
Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824)).
2. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
3. At least forty-one states recognize some form of a public policy exception to the employment at will
rule. See Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1583, 1594 n.64 (1994) (citing 39 states that have
judicially created a public policy exception); McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 607 (Miss.
1993) (adopting a public policy exception); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1995) (adopting a just cause statute
which assumes a public policy exception).
Only Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and New York strictly adhere to the at-will rule. See
Pennington, supra at 1594 n.64. Even the most stringent defenders of the employment at will doctrine recog-
nize the need for some form of public policy exception. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 949 (1984); Richard W Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 881, 884 (1983).
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short of an agreement on any one public policy exception rule or approach. The
purpose of this Comment is to advocate a specific public policy exception rule.
This Comment will argue that a proper public policy exception begins with the
assumption that the employment at will rule is still the most effective legal doc-
trine by which to govern modem employment relationships. It is possible to have
a public policy rule which does not take away from the effectiveness of the
employment at will rule yet still serves the public interest. Thus, there is no need
to permit a public policy exception to serve the public interest which dismantles
the at-will rule in its current form. After a brief background of the employment
at will rule and its exceptions in section I, section II will address the issue of
what the public policy exception should hope to accomplish and why it is neces-
sary. It will also demonstrate that it is possible to create a narrow public policy
exception that serves the public interest without undermining the effectiveness of
the employment at will rule.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. The History of the EmploymentAt Will Doctrine
The employment at will doctrine is the law in almost every state jurisdiction.'
The origins of this common law rule are generally traced back to the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution and the growing dominance of laissez faire econom-
ics.5 The benchmark for acceptance of the employment at will rule is usually
4. Sid L. Moller, The Revolution That Wasn't: On the Business as Usual Aspects of Employment at Will, 27
U. RICH. L. REV. 441,441 (1993).
5. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118, 118-19
(1976). Professor Feinman found that American master-servant law followed English common law until the lat-
ter part of the nineteenth century. Id. at 123. Citing a treatise written by Charles Smith, CHARLES M. SMITH, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 41 (1852), Professor Feinman sums up American common law
on employment tenure as follows:
Covering English law with reference to American cases, Smith's treatise was noted for its exhaustive
discussion of the intricacies of the law and it had significant impact for that reason. Smith stated a
presumption that a general hiring was a yearly hiring for all servants, the presumption was rebut-
table by custom or other evidence, and, in spite of a yearly hiring, the relation was terminable on
notice where that was customary.
Feinman, supra at 123 (citations omitted). The basis of the English rule is traced back to 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. Feinman, supra at 120. Although this rule developed out of an agricultural soci-
ety, Blackstone extended this rule to all classes of servants. Feinman, supra at 120 (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425).
Professor Feinman contributes the break with English precedent in the middle of the nineteenth century with
a confusion that developed over the nature of master and servant law. Feinman, supra at 123. He sums the
development of the employment at will rule as an off-shot of this confusion. Feinman, supra at 123. Because
master and servant law was classified as a domestic relation, the break up of the domestic relation in the
employment field with the rise of industry caused confusion over whether "yearly hiring" ought to be applied to
corporate employment. Feinman, supra at 123-24. Feinman concluded:
As the nineteenth century progressed, however, the true master-servant relation became overshad-
owed by the number of employees whose relationship to their employers was essentially commercial
and therefore did not fit the pattern. The resulting tension influenced the direction of the law, with
the earlier perception acting as a force delaying accommodations to new economic conditions.
Feinman, supra at 123.
Eventually, the absolute rule of the employment at will doctrine prevailed over all employment relationships.
Feinman assigns several influences that made it possible for the employment at will rule to prevail: (1) the rise
of laissezfaire economics, (2) the influence of a treatise by HORACE WOOD, HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT (1877), and the acceptance of this rule in New York, in Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895), which was the "center of commerce and a leader in the law." Feinman, supra at
124-29.
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dated around the 1880s. 6 However, some states established this rule as early as
1858.' Prior to the development of the employment at will rule, the United
States followed English precedent which held that employment tenure was one
year.
B. The Employment At Will Doctrine
The employment at will rule is a presumption of common law that, unless the
parties manifest a different intention, the employment relationship is terminable
at the will of either party.9 This presumption rests on the premise commonly
referred to as the "freedom of contract."1 This term is best explained from a
passage of Richard Epstein's book on discrimination laws entitled Forbidden
Grounds:
Freedom of contract on this matter [of employment contracts] is no different
from freedom of speech or freedom of action. Unless and until the contract in
question poses the threat of harm to third parties... or is procured by fraud or
sharp practice, then each person is his or her own best judge both of the private
costs incurred by contracting and of the private benefits obtained from that con-
tract.11
As seen in the preceding passage, the freedom to contract is not without limita-
tions. Three categories map out the conditions under which these limitations are
needed: manner, circumstances, and content. 2 The manner in which a contract
is conceived involves procedural protections. 3 An example'is the statute of
frauds prohibiting oral contracts in the sale of land. 4 In the event that an indi-
vidual was forced to sign a contract at gun point, the duress defense would make
the contract unenforceable due to the circumstances surrounding its creation.'
5
Finally, a promise to injure a third party is also unenforceable because of its con-
tent.'" The rationale behind these limitations is easily understood and is designed
to protect individual autonomy, not interfere with it. However, paternalistic limi-
tations have a different purpose. As defined, these limitations are designed to
"promote or protect the individual's own welfare."" The unconscionability
defense is one example of this type of limitation. 8 All of these contract limita-
tions act as constructions to the formation of any contract.
6. Two leading cases are Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 517 (1884) and Martin v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895).
7. Butler v. Smith & Tharp, 35 Miss. 457, 464 (1858).
8. See Feinman, supra note 5, at 123.
9. MUtAy, supra note 1, at 92.
10. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 92.
11. RIcHRt A. EPSTErN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 149 (1992)[hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS].





17. Id. at 254.
18. Id.
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The remedy, in regard to these limitations, is to make the agreement unenforce-
able among the parties to the contract. However, a wrongful discharge action, on
the other hand, acts more like a remedy for a breach of contract. It is designed to
compensate the employee for a termination that, while not prohibited in their
employment agreement, is by law impermissible. Some such wrongful discharge
actions are created by statute, like the discrimination laws, but the one featured
in this Comment is a common law creation.
In this context, public policy plays two separate roles in discussing what limita-
tions should be placed on an individual's autonomy to contract freely. There are
the paternalistic and non-paternalistic roles. In the paternalistic role, public poli-
cy questions the utility of a contract to both the community and the individual
because of what some perceive as the inequalities in bargaining power in
employment contracts. The "freedom of contract" is called into question because
those who are unable to bargain for their self-interests will be worse off, and
hence, the community at large is worse off. Public policy arguments, in this
sense, challenge the utility of the method of contracting. In a non-paternalistic
role, public policy is aimed at the content of contracts that is injurious to third
parties. For example, a contract to dump hazardous waste on an individual's pri-
vate property may benefit the contracting parties but damage the drinking water
of the community. Since third parties would be injured, the contract is unen-
forceable. When discussing the public policy exception, it is helpful to keep in
mind these basic contract principles and the role in which a public policy excep-
tion is advocated or criticized.
C. Exceptions to the Employment At Will Rule
Up until the 1970's, the employment at will rule went largely unchallenged by
the courts.19 However, since that time, three exceptions to the common law
employment at will rule have come to be generally recognized: (1) the implied
contract theory, (2) the covenant theory of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) the
public policy tort."
1. Implied Contract Theory
The implied contract theory21 allows recovery in a contract action if the
employee can show an implied promise by the employer not to terminate the
plaintiff at will. The employee must establish a breach of contract by demon-
19. Moller, supra note 4, at 441.
20. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie?,
58 U. CrIN. L. REv. 397, 398-99 (1989).
21. The basic elements of an implied contract claim are as follows:
1. The employer made a promise for employment security.
2. The employee gave consideration for the promise, in the form of detrimental reliance by continu-
ing employment or otherwise.
3. The employer breached the promise by dismissing the employee.
4. The employee suffered damages.
Id. at 398.
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strating that either separate consideration for a promise of job security was
given" or some representation by the employer such as in an employment manu-
al, is implied in the employment contract.23 In many states, a statement in a
handbook or a contract which clearly stipulates that the employer does not intend
to waive his right to terminate at will is enough to defeat an implied contract
claim.24
2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Like the implied contract theory, this theory is based on contract principles.25
In its most sweeping terms, this theory would imply that any employment con-
tract requires an employer to exercise his right to terminate the relationship in
good faith.26 In essence, all an employee must show is that there was an employ-
ment relationship and that the firing was in bad faith. 27 The few jurisdictions that
have adopted this theory have done so by limiting its protection to long term
employees" or to those fired to avoid bonus or commission payments.29
3. Public Policy Tort3"
One of the more popular exceptions" to the employment at will rule, and the
focus of this Comment, is the public policy tort. The public policy exception is
based on a tort theory that allows a plaintiff to recover for wrongful discharge
when his termination contravenes the public policy of the state. In order to
demonstrate a wrongful discharge, the plaintiff is usually required to prove four
elements:
1. That a clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal
constitution, statute, or administrative regulation, or in the common law (the
clarity element).
2. That dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in the
plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element).
3. The plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by the conduct related to the public
policy (the causation element).
22. Independent consideration for a term or indefinite period of employment constitutes an employment
contract. See Rape v. Mobile & O.R., 100 So. 585, 586 (Miss. 1924); Windfield v. Groen Div., Dover Corp.,
740 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
23. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (a leading case on
the implied contract theory). For an excellent discussion on Toussaint and its national impact on employee
"rights," see Moller, supra note 4, at 460-67.
24. See Moller, supra note 4, at 460-67.
25. See Moller, supra note 4, at 478-89.
26. Perritt, supra note 20, at 399.
27. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv.
L. RE. 1931, 1936 (1983) [hereinafter Protecting Employees].
28. Id. at 1935-36; Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,456 (1980) (longevity of employment
constituted a significant factor in deciding a wrongful discharge).
29. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (allowing recovery of sales
commissions withheld after the plaintiff was fired).
30. Some states do not find a public policy action in tort but instead in contract law or both. See generally
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
31. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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4. The employer lacked an overriding legitimate business justification for the
dismissal (the overriding justification element).
3 2
The difficulty for most courts is in first deciding whether the public policy of
the state has, in fact, been offended (clarity element) and, if so, whether the pub-
lic policy of the state is served or protected by allowing a wrongful discharge
action (jeopardy element).
II. WHfAT IS A PROPER PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION?
A. The Foundation for a Public Policy Exception
1. The Scope of a Public Policy Exception
The breadth of any public policy exception rule hinges, in part, on a court's
rationale for initiating this contractual limitation. If a court lacks confidence in
the utility of employment contracts procured under the at-will doctrine, it might
create an exception that protects employee interests that it believes promote a
public policy of equality and economic stability. In juxtaposition to the utilitari-
an approach is the argument to narrowly limit the content permissible in a con-
tract. Here, the court is confident that the at-will rule maximizes the self-inter-
ests of the parties to a contract. Therefore, the court will only impose limitations
as to the content of an agreement which contravenes public policy and injures
third parties. A utilitarian rationale creates a public policy exception which
would move towards swallowing the at-will doctrine and replacing it with a just
cause dismissal rule.3 In contrast, a content based rationale for a public policy
limitation reaffirms the wisdom of the at-will doctrine while limiting it, as with
any other content based contractual limitation, from injuring third parties.
This Comment, as previously noted, does not attack the utility of the at-will
rule, but instead, it assumes that the current rule maximizes the self-interests of
all the parties to the employment agreement and the welfare of the public gener-
ally.34 By assuming that the employment at will rule is the most effective method
by which to govern private employment relationships, only one area of concern is
left open for discussion - policing the content of employment relationships that
32. Perritt, supra note 20, at 398-99.
33. Protecting Employees, supra note 27, at 1948. Cf Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At
Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947, 953 (1984) [hereinafter Defense]. Professor Epstein explained that when arguing
for a pubic policy exception that seeks to abolish the at-will doctrine, it is usually argued in
terms of what [the exception] hope[s] to achieve.... Instead [the exception] should be evaluated for
the generally harsh results that [it] actually produce[s]. [It] introduce[s] an enormous amount of
undesirable complexity into the law of employment relations; [it] increase[s] the frequency of civil
litigation; and over the broad run of cases [it] work[s] to the disadvantage of both the employers and
the employees whose conduct [it] govern[s].
Id.
34. See generally Greene v. Oliver, 526 A.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Pa. 1987); Defense, supra note 33, at 957;
Power, supra note 3, at 888-91; Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Contract: An Interest and
Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IowA L. Rav. 327 (1984).
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are injurious to third parties. However, before evaluating what type of public
policy exception best protects these interests, it is imperative to establish a foun-
dation for why a public policy exception is needed and how it will affect the
operation of the at-will rule. This foundation is necessary in order to balance the
goal of policing employment contracts injurious to the public versus the goal of
not inhibiting the freedom of contract protected by the at-will rule. Section II.B.
of this Comment will balance these goals in formulating an effective public poli-
cy exception.
2. Why a Public Policy Exception is Needed
The reason for having the public policy exception is to protect the public inter-
est as defined by the public policy of the community at large. Generally, the
public policy of any state can be summed up as that which "'is [a] principle of
law that no one can lawfully do that which [is] . . . injurious to the public.'
' 35
Applying this standard to employment contracts, an employer and an employee
cannot contract to do that which is injurious to the public, i.e. that which harms
third parties. In the scheme of millions of employment contracts nationwide,
few are likely to be contingent on injuring the public good. However, like any
other contract that contains an illicit purpose, the problem is significant enough
that an action in tort is appropriate. Consider the following:
"[Whereas] [c]ontract actions are created to protect the interest in having
promises performed," "[t]ort actions are created to protect the interest in free-
dom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them
are imposed by law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not neces-
sarily upon the will or intention of the parties....
While, so far, the goal of protecting third parties is quite sound, it is not clear
that a wrongful discharge tort action, which doubles as a rule of construction in
employment contracts, is necessarily the best method by which to achieve this
goal. Why allow a tort action, especially if there is already a criminal penalty or
tort remedy available to the injured third party? Why create an additional safe-
guard? Two reasons exist: prevention and legitimacy.
A public policy wrongful discharge action is aimed at preventing criminal and
tortious conduct before it occurs; whereas, criminal penalties and other tort
remedies are primarily aimed at punishment after the fact in hopes of deterring
others from engaging in the same conduct. Criminal law provides criminal sanc-
tions for intent crimes, but the focus is still on catching the lawbreakers in the act
and using their punishment to deter others. A public policy exception rule allows
35. FREDERICK A. WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 62 (5th ed. 1953) (citing Cahill v. Gilman, 84 Misc. 372,
146 N.Y.S. 224 (1914)).
36. As previously discussed, an action can also be found in contract. This depends on the jurisdiction.
However, I prefer a tort remedy because it allows an employee to seek punitive damages and hence, is a better
deterrent.
37. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971)).
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more effective police protection of the public good because it encourages com-
pliance with public policy by rewarding compliance. It creates an incentive that
encourages employees to prevent injurious behavior rather than relying on the
threat of punishment to deter them from complying with harmful employer direc-
tives.
Besides acting as an effective police power, the public policy exception pre-
vents the use of the at-will rule as a shield against law suits by honest employees.
While the at-will rule may allow a "bad" reason, it should not allow an illegal
reason. The at-will rule is designed to provide the greatest amount of freedom in
contracting employment terms and is not designed to carry out private interests
which are intended to harm the public welfare. The public policy exception pro-
tects the at-will rule from the miserable fate of promoting illicit behavior which
in turn would undermine the legitimacy of the common law rule in the eyes of
society.
3. Benefits/Flexibility
Having looked at the need for, and the benefits of, a public policy exception, it
is time to turn to the other end of the scale and weigh the benefits of the at-will
rule in the labor market. Any proposed exception should be judged not only for
the benefits it produces, but also for those it takes away. Once the benefits from
the at-will rule are delineated, this Comment will discuss how contractual limita-
ions, such as a public policy exception, can hinder the cffectiveness of the at-
will rule and consequently affect the labor market.
Professor Richard Epstein summarized the benefits derived from the employ-
ment at will rule:
No system of regulation can hope to match the benefits that the contract at will
affords in employment relations. The flexibility afforded by the contract at will
permits the ceaseless marginal adjustments that are necessary in any ongoing
productive activity conducted, as all activities are, in conditions of technological
and business change.38
The significance of the employment at will rule is ensconced in one single word
- flexibility. The at-will doctrine allows a voluntary exchange of services for
money by allowing employers and employees the freedom to dictate the terms of
an employment arrangement most suitable to their own needs. 9 From this sys-
tem of voluntary exchange, the labor market is provided with the flexibility nec-
essary to meet changing technological and business demands, thereby making
the economy more productive.4" In contrast, restrictive rules of contract con-
struction hamper employment arrangements causing a loss of flexibility. 1 This
38. Defense, supra note 33, at 982.
39. Morgan 0. Reynolds, Economics of Labor 3-22-24 (Fall 1990) (Unpublished manuscript, on file with
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loss of flexibility in employment contracts gives individuals less choice and
causes the economy to be less productive.42 The consequences of lowered pro-
ductivity are reduced business formation and employment.43
In examining the loss of flexibility caused by a contractual limitation, the level
of interference in an employer's or an employee's ability to contract freely is ana-
lyzed. In the case of a public policy exception, as with many other employment
restrictions, the focus is on an employer's freedom to terminate the relationship.
The greater the pressure on an employer to justify employee terminations, the
higher will be the level of interference in making these decisions, which, in turn,
causes the labor market to be less flexible. To understand how making an
employer justify his decision to terminate affects the flexibility currently given to
him under the at-will rule, it is helpful to investigate how external pressures
cause internal inflexibility.
When an external force, such as the court, holds an employer legally responsi-
ble for justifying his personnel decisions, the result is internal pressure on the
firm's system of hiring and firing employees. These pressures become relevant
before a termination ever ends up in the courtroom, which is the reason they are
relevant to how a contractual limitation can cause a loss of flexibility in the labor
market. Two identifiable internal pressures which influence an employer's per-
sonnel decisions are (1) the level of formality in dismissing an employee and (2)
the cost of replacing an employee.
The formality of an employment decision speaks to the internal practices used
by a firm in firing and hiring. For example, is it in the firm's interest to set up
elaborate record keeping of employee activities, establish a system by which an
employee is evaluated every six months, institute a disciplinary system that
warns employees of terminable conduct, and so forth? The more rigid the proce-
dures, the less flexible the system will be in rooting out unproductive employees.
In regard to how employment laws can heighten the formality of an employer's
decision, consider the following passage from Richard Epstein's book, Forbidden
Grounds, where he remarks on the reach of discrimination laws outside the
courtroom:
The motive test of the antidiscrimination laws becomes relevant before trial,
where it exerts a pervasive influence on the internal patterns and practices of the
firm. Under common law the firm could choose that level of formality neces-
sary to function with a minimum of record keeping and documentation. But
once all employment decisions are justiciable, the external pressures for formal-
ity become far stronger.... Wholly lost in the process is the argument that free
mobility of labor provides better protection for all workers than any system of
judicial or administrative review of employment decisions.44
Not only do such laws interfere with employment decisions by making them
more formal, but they also make them more costly. The easier it is for an
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 11, at 176.
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employee to challenge his employer's decision to end their contractual relation-
ship, the more likely it is that an employer will compute the cost of a lawsuit
along with the cost of finding and training a replacement. In California, for
instance, it is estimated that an employment discrimination case costs $80,000 to
defend.4" This additional cost makes replacements more costly. Courts too are
aware of the dangers associated with the threat of potential court costs:
The . . . insidious danger, . . . is that an employer may justly discharge an
employee only at the risk of being compelled to defend a suit for retaliatory dis-
charge. If such a cause of action generally could be maintained, employers, par-




The more far-reaching the public policy exception is, or appears to be, the
greater the likelihood that it will exert both of these pressures on employment
decisions and thereby interfere with mobility and competition in the labor mar-
ket. There are three elements that test a wrongful discharge claim for its level of
interference. All three gauge the level of interference by gauging the frequency
and likelihood that an employer will be forced to justify his hiring and firing
decisions. First, is it relatively simple to establish a claim? This question goes to
the clarity and jeopardy elements mentioned in section I.C.3.(regarding the com-
ponents of a public policy exception claim). Second, is it relatively simple to
establish causation (demonstrating motivation), thereby forcing the employer to
show that his decision was not motivated by an illegal motive? This second
inquiry examines the relative ease of demonstrating an employer's motivation,
i.e. the causation and justification elements of the claim. Instrumental in this
second inquiry is the allocation of the burden of proof. Third, do the available
remedies create an economic incentive to file suit?
Title VII litigation by analogy illustrates this point quite well. The designated
evil is personnel decisions motivated by an employee's sex, race, color, ethnic ori-
gin, or religion.47 Currently, all an employee must do to show causation in a dis-
parate treatment case, let us say a race case, is to show that he belongs to a racial
minority, he was qualified (using objective rather than subjective standards), and
that he did not get the position.' The employer then is required to put forward a
non-discriminatory reason, and the employee (always carrying the burden of
proof) may argue that the employer's rationale is purely pretextual.49 If, on the
other hand, an employee was required to put forward more evidence to imply that
the employer was actually motivated by the employee's race, the incentive to chal-
lenge the employer's decision would decrease. In both scenarios, the designated
evil is attacked, but one with less harm to the market's flexibility, and arguably,
nearly the effectiveness in combating discrimination in the workplace.
45. David Frum, The Right to Fire, FORBES, Oct. 26, 1992, at 76.
46. Rozier v. Saint Mary's Hosp., 411 N.E.2d 50, 54 (ll. App. Ct. 1980) (emphasis added).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
48. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
49. Id. at 802-03.
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Continuing with the Title VII analogy, one can see how changes in the law
interfere with and restrict the flexibility available under common law. Referring
back to the three pivotal questions in determining a wrongful discharge action's
interference in the common law structure, one can see why discrimination laws
have a high level of interference. It is relatively easy to state a claim and to infer
illegal motivation on the employer's behalf. Consequently, it is easy to force an
employer to justify his decision; therefore, Title VII interferes with the flexibility
of the labor market. Finally, the discrimination laws definitely create an incen-
tive to sue, since attorney's fees are granted to a prevailing plaintiff. It is the pro-
cedure for implementing the motivational element that contributes to a high level
of interference from discrimination laws.
The most significant problem with a public policy exception case, however,
does not lie in proving illegal motivation (as is true with Title VII litigation).
Instead, it lies in the muddy waters of determining whether a public policy has
been contravened by an employee's termination, i.e. the clarity and jeopardy ele-
ments. Without a bright line rule, these waters will undoubtedly remain muddy.
The muddier the water, the greater the influence the public policy exception will
have on forcing an employer to justify his employment decisions. When an
employer is unsure as to whether or not a claim can be stated, he will be more
cautious, letting the internal pressures of formality and cost creep in and inter-
fere in a decision that would most likely be made solely in regard to
productivity.5"
In the case of discrimination laws, this country has adopted a "scorched earth"
approach. We deemed the evil of discrimination to be so reprehensible that
despite the adopted approach's negative ramifications on the labor market, such
an approach is necessary. The decision that needs to be made with the public
policy exception is to decide if possible harm to the public interest resulting from
employment contracts is as unacceptable as discrimination; and thus, that the
social benefits derived from the at-will rule are worth sacrificing.
B. The Case For a Limited Public Policy Exception
In the previous sub-section, the underpinnings for a public policy exception
were emplaced. The benefits of the at-will rule were explored in order to ensure
that the proper balance between protecting the public and ensuring a flexible
labor market is struck when developing a public policy exception. The next step
is to create an exception which protects the public interest while not undermining
the usefulness of the at-will rule. If this is not attainable, the debate on the pub-
lic policy exception changes. If the goal of protecting third parties cannot be
achieved by an exception which does not undermine the at-will rule, then it is
necessary to reweigh the interests of these same goals against an exception which
would significantly alter the at-will rule."1
50. See generally FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 11.
51. Still, this debate is different from one which evaluates the public policy of the at-will rule as to what is
best for the economy, the employees, and the employers.
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The first part of this sub-section's analysis will delve into the legal anatomy of
a public policy claim. This analysis will identify the source of public policy pro-
nouncements and discuss how those pronouncements will define an actionable
wrongful discharge claim. The second part of this analysis brings in the concern
of developing a rule which does little to disturb the at-will rule. Several public
policy exception approaches will be examined for their level of interference in
employment relationships and in the operation of the at-will rule. At one end of
the debate is a call for a "just cause"52 dismissal rule - the highest level of inter-
ference. At the other end of the debate is a call for a wrongful discharge action
only when the employer has fired an employee for refusing to perform a task that
violates either a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision - the lowest
form of governmental interference. To settle this issue, two questions must be
answered: (1) does the lowest level of government interference adequately regu-
late the employment relationship to protect third parties? If yes, there is no need
to consider the second question; (2) if no, does a higher level of governmental
interference significantly better protect the public? If no, then the lowest level of
interference is preferred.
1. The Anatomy of a Public Policy Exception
Before making a decision regarding the best rule for protecting the public wel-
fare, a court must be able to articulate the public policy of the state. This task
involves a two part analysis. First, a court must determine where it will look for
pronouncements of the state's public policy, i.e. the source. Three possible
sources from which a court may extract policy statements are the federal and
state constitutions, statutory and regulatory laws, and the court itself. The next
requirement, and the most difficult step in most jurisdictions, is to articulate a
public policy from whatever source the court has chosen. The reason for this dif-
ficulty evolves from the problems associated with using the public-private right
analysis.5 3 This analysis defines public policy as that which harms the general
public and not merely the private concerns of an individual. 4 Inevitably, it can
almost always be argued that what is classified as a private right has some attenu-
ated effect on the general public, and therefore, should qualify as a public policy
offense." Therein lies the problem for the courts - where do they draw the
line?
No matter how or where a court draws this line, it should allow a wrongful dis-
charge action in tort for those employees who report a violation of a specific
statutory, regulatory, or constitutional provision (the whistle blower exception).
A whistle blower provision usually protects employees who report illegal activi-
ties to their supervisors or to governmental authorities. The reason for allowing
52. As previously discussed, the "just cause" dismissal requirement can address both utilitarian concerns
and content concerns arising from contracts injurious to third parties. Its use here is designed to address the
content, not the utility, of at-will contracts.
53. Protecting Employees, supra note 27, at 1948.
54. Protecting Employees, supra note 27, at 1948-50.
55. Protecting Employees, supra note 27, at 1947.
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this extension is grounded in the same logic that permits a cause of action for
an employee who refuses to participate in illegal behavior - it protects third
parties.
Finally, a court must balance an employer's right to manage his business
against the contravened public policy where the policy defined is not a specific
statutory prohibition. 6 If a statutory provision prohibits the conduct reported,
courts are unwilling to weigh a legislature's purpose against the business interest
of an individual employer.5 7
2. An Evaluation of the Possible Public Policy Exceptions
Understanding how a court identifies expressions of public policy which create
an action for wrongful discharge is essential to comprehending how different
public policy exceptions interfere in the contractual freedom of employees and
employers. This sub-section breaks down actual and suggested public policy
exceptions into three general categories by their definitions rather than their
source. Each of these possible exceptions can have various sources which will
necessarily restrict their scope. However, it is how the rule is defined, using any
of these sources, which has the most significant impact on an exception's level of
interference in the labor market. The three categories of approaches that a court
may use are the illegal approach, the public purpose approach, and the just cause
approach.
a. The Illegal Approach
The least restrictive approach in carving out a public policy exception is to
allow wrongful discharge actions only when an employee is terminated for refus-
ing to "participate in an illegal act"58 or for "reporting illegal acts."59 In its
broadest form, an illegal approach could encompass illegality as to constitution-
al, legislative, regulatory, ethical, or common law provisions. A Mississippi case
illustrates this approach in its clearest form. In McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix
Co., an employee was allegedly fired for reporting his supervisor to company
management because his supervisor was requiring him to violate state pest con-
trol regulations and to cheat customers in violation of a state criminal statute.61
The employee clearly identified provisions of state law which he claimed his
immediate supervisor forced him to violate. However, the court went further
than merely holding that the specific statutes implicated a public policy; instead,
it stated a general rule that only where an employee is terminated for refusing to
56. See Power, supra note 3, at 883.
57. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Il1. 1981). "[International Harvester's] busi-
ness judgment, no matter how sound, cannot override that decision. '(T)he employer is not so absolute a sover-
eign of the job that there are not limits to his prerogative."' Id. at 880 (quoting Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980)).
58. McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993).
59. Id.
60. 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993).
61. Id. at 605.
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engage in illegal behavior or terminated for reporting the same will he have a
wrongful discharge claim. This rule is a logical extension of the rationale pro-
hibiting the alleged conduct in the first place. If the business cannot commit
these violations on their own, neither can they raise a legitimate business concern
for forcing their employee to perform these illegal tasks. This approach also has
the advantage of eliminating the balancing test of employer versus public inter-
ests because the policy prohibiting the conduct already renders this determina-
tion in favor of the state.
This approach creates a bright line rule by which to evaluate an employee's
claim and eliminates the ambiguity normally associated with distinguishing a
public interest from a private one. Even where a court is willing to use a broad
source for finding illegal behavior, employees must implicate a specific prohibi-
tion to maintain a claim. While this approach protects the public against illegal
behavior, it makes it difficult for disgruntled employees to imply that their termi-
nation harmed the public good unless they were actually instructed to engage in
prohibited conduct. On the other hand, the employer, under this approach, will
not be concerned that at a future date he will have to justify his decision beyond
the contractual terms of his contract with the employee. Therefore, none of the
internal or external pressures are brought to bear on an employer's decision,
other than those pressures that are either business related or clearly defined pub-
lic interests.
b. The Public Purpose Approach
The public purpose approach casts a wider net than the illegal approach
because, in addition to recognizing that a discharge of an honest employee
injures the public, it recognizes wrongful discharge actions for employees who
can allege that their terminations harm the public good in any general manner.
However, if the matter in dispute has only private ramifications, instead of public
ones, no public policy claim will exist. Drawing this line is the "Achilles' heel"
of the public purpose approach, and, consequently, it allows former employees
greater latitude to establish a claim.
The public policy exception followed in Illinois aptly illustrates the dynamics
of the public purpose approach. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,62 the Supreme Court
of Illinois permitted the first exception to its at-will rule for an employee who
was terminated for refusing to withdraw a workers' compensation claim she had
submitted for a cut thumb.63 When the employee filed suit against Motorola,
there was no statutory exception to the at-will rule prohibiting an employer from
discharging employees under such circumstances. 4 However, the court held that
an employer does not have "absolute power" to terminate its employees and that,
in fact, it may not exercise this power to prevent an employee from "asserting his
62. 384 N.E.2d 353 (I11. 978).
63. Id. at 356. Kelsay was informed that it was company policy to terminate the employees who "pursued
workmen's compensation claims against it." Id.
64. Id. at 357.
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statutory rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act.""5 The court's public
policy rationale was based on its own interpretation of the Act's public purpose,
rather than an intention of the legislature to prohibit such terminations.6" "This
result, which effectively relieves the employer of the responsibility expressly
placed upon him by the legislature, is untenable and is contrary to the public pol-
icy as expressed in the ... Act .... even in the absence of an explicit proscription
against retaliatory discharge ... "67 The employee's law suit served a public pur-
pose, because, without it, all employees would effectively be left without a com-
mon law or statutory remedy thereby emasculating the public purpose of the act
to compensate injured workers.68 Compare this with the illegal approach. If
Kelsay had filed the same suit in Mississippi, her case would have been dis-
missed because she would have failed to demonstrate a public policy which pro-
hibited such actions; and furthermore, to allow a common law action would be to
engraft upon an act a purpose for which it was not intended. 9
The lower courts interpreted Kelsay as applying exclusively to workers' com-
pensation claims.7" Following several unsatisfactory applications of the new
rule, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its seminal public policy exception
case, Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.71 Here, the court elaborated on
the contours of the rule it established in Kelsay.72 As a general rule the court
remarked that "public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the State collectively. 7 3 It went on to say that such pronouncements
can be found in the state's constitution, statutes, and in judicial decisions.74
Naturally, recognizing that such a broad view of public policy does not lend itself
to a bright line rule in separating those claims that are "subject[s] of public poli-
cies from matters purely personal,"7 " the court said that it would investigate
whether the matter complained of "strike[s] at the heart of a citizen's social
rights, duties, and responsibilities before [a public policy exception claim] will
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. J.C. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981). See also Alison Steiner, The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Workers' Compensation: The Employees' Perspective, 62 Miss.
L.J. 631, 632 (1993).
70. Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 444 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
71. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 878.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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be allowed."7 In short, the court would look to whether such pronouncements of
public policy had a singular public purpose."
Discerning where a court will limit its search for a public purpose in an
employee's wrongful discharge claim is an ominous task.78 In Wiesman v.
Kienstra,79 another Illinois case, an employee with a pre-existing knee injury was
terminated because his employer allegedly feared that he would suffer an injury
on the job and would file a workers' compensation claim.8" The court found that
the policy in the Workers' Compensation Act was to protect those who have
claims and not those who might have a claim.81 Furthermore, even if such public
policy could be found in the law, the court was prepared to permit a business jus-
tification for the dismissal because of an employer's need to employ safe dri-
vers.82 Justice Chapman, in his dissent, cogently argued that the public policy
line was misdrawn.83  He rationalized that if the Act prohibits freely bargained
employment contracts from trading away an employee's right to workers' com-
pensation then surely, "can there be any doubt that [the Act] will prohibit unilat-
erally imposed restrictions such as discharge because of the possibility of a
future workers' compensation claim?"
84
Despite a court's attempt to narrowly tailor its use of the public purpose
approach, the inherent open-ended nature of such a search, available to each new
claim with a different fact pattern, prevents this approach from being bridled. To
76. Id. at 878-79.
77. Id. at 879. "[A] cause of action is allowed where the public policy is clear, but is denied where it is
equally clear that only private interests are at stake." Id.
The court's application of this approach in Palmateer demonstrates the greater latitude the public purpose
approach provides a court than the illegal approach and thereby, demonstrates how it has a greater level of
interference in the contractual freedom of the at-will rule. Palmateer was fired for supplying information that a
company employee had violated a provision in the Illinois Criminal Code and assisting local law enforcement
in the investigation. Id. at 877.
The court found that Palmateer properly alleged that he was fired in violation of a clear public policy despite
no specific constitutional or statutory provision requiring citizens to take affirmative action when they have
knowledge of a crime being committed. Id. at 880. Once the crime was reported, Palmateer then had a statuto-
ry duty to assist in the investigation. Id.
Unlike jurisdictions which require that the employee either refuse to commit an illegal act (which in this case
would have been if Palmateer had participated in the investigation after his employer requested that he not par-
ticipate) or report an illegal act (which in this case would have been reporting the criminal activity of his co-
worker), the court only looked to see if the complainant's claim had a public purpose, not merely a private one,
which could be gleaned from the state's laws or court decisions. Id.
The court stated that public policy favors "citizen crime fighters," and because Palmateer's suit served this
policy, it was clearly not merely a private dispute. Id.
78. Ambiguous decisions demonstrating the Illinois court's devotion toward keeping its public policy excep-
tion narrow include: Zientrara v. Long Creek Township, 569 N.E.2d 1299 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) (a First
Amendment issue); Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (a discharge related to
filing a health insurance claim); Paris v. Cherry Payment Sys., Inc., 638 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (access
to the courts).
79. 604 N.E.2d 1126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
80. Id. at 1128.
81. Id. at 1129 (unless the employee filed a claim or suffered an injury, he has not performed an activity
covered by the Workers' Compensation Act).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1133.
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the extent that it can be narrowly applied, it still will leave the employer unsure
of his legal footing, causing him to err on the side of caution when making a
business decision to terminate an employee. The inherent ambiguity of the pub-
lic purpose approach motivates an employer to make decisions which he believes
will one day appear justified in the eyes of a judge or jury.
But for what good? Unlike the illegal approach, which produces tangible
results in protecting the public, the only additional benefit of the public purpose
approach is that it reaches tenuous public concerns.8" In the case of workers'
compensation, employees are still able to collect on their claims even if terminat-
ed. There is no assurance that, in disturbing the at-will rule, other employees
will be protected. Furthermore, the case can be made that the threat of termina-
tion may deter abuse of the compensation system. In contrast, the illegal
approach focuses on preventing illicit behavior, such as criminal conduct or pol-
lution, which poses a direct and immediate threat to third parties.
c. The Just Cause Approach
The just cause approach prohibits any discharge which is not for good cause
instead of prohibiting a category of terminations which are deemed harmful. The
rationale for such an approach is to insure that all injurious behavior to third par-
ties is prevented. But despite the rationale a court or legislature may implement
to support the use of such an approach, it is not an exception, but is instead a
repeal of the at-will rule. In order to justify such an approach, one would have to
deem the public at such a high risk of injury from allowing individuals the free-
dom to construct their own employment terms that only a requirement that the
employer prove that he fired an employee for a "good reason" adequately pro-
tects the public welfare. Furthermore, an argument would have to be made that
any other public policy exception to the at-will rule is inadequate to satisfactorily
protect third party interests. Thus far, calls for such a rule have been largely aca-
demic, except for a Montana statute which requires that all dismissals be sup-
ported by a good reason.8"
The level of interference caused by the just cause approach in the labor market
is obvious. Its name demonstrates that it is designed to cause every employer to
justify his employment decisions. As discussed earlier, any rule which moves an
employer to have to defend his termination decisions in court brings with it inter-
85. This criticism also applies to statutory exceptions to the employment at will rule (e.g. Title VII, the
Equal Pay Act, wage and hour laws, and the National Labor Relations Act), excluding protections for whistle
blowers, that seek to monitor private employment relationships. See generally FORBIDDEN GRouNDs, supra note
11.
86. The Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE Ai. § 39-2-904 (1995). See generally
PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 96-99 (1990). Weiler criticizes this statute because it is too
restrictive in the amount of damages it allows thereby, giving it more roar than bite. WEILER, supra at 96-99.
The Montana statute only allows an employee to recover net loss earnings up to four years. WEILER, supra at
96-99. All other possible remedies are foreclosed. Neither is there a provision allowing a prevailing employee
to collect attorney's fees. A more generous remedy structure, such as that found in Title VII or public policy
torts (both of which allow punitive damages) gives an employee and his attorney an incentive to sue the offend-
ing employer. WEILER, supra at 96-99.
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nal and external pressures on the employer that have negative effects on person-
nel decisions. The concentration in just cause dismissals will be on an employ-
er's motivation; and unlike the public purpose approach, it will make every firing
a plausible claim.
The question that must be dealt with here is whether or not the at-will rule
poses such a threat to the public welfare that this level of intervention in the
employment relationship is necessary. Without a doubt, this is the most effective
approach for covering every possible public harm, but is it necessary? To justify
such an approach, one would have to argue that the laws which currently swamp
businesses and individuals, prohibiting everything from jaywalking to pollution,
are inadequate to ensure that the public will not be harmed by private employ-
ment contracts. Because such a proposition is obviously implausible, any call for
a just cause rule to protect the public from illicit employment contracts should be
abandoned.
III. CONCLUSION
Once the case has been made for policing employment relationships in order to
protect those outside the employment contract, it is necessary to seek out a reme-
dy to protect these interests with the least amount of interference in an individ-
ual's freedom of contract. By evaluating each proposed exception for its level of
interference and the protection gained therefrom, one can create an exception
that reflects the value of the benefits derived from the at-will nile while protect-
ing against possible harm to the public welfare. A narrow public policy excep-
tion, the illegal approach, protects third parties with little interference in the free-
dom of contract while preserving flexibility in the labor market which the
employment at will rule has so faithfully guarded for so many years.
[VOL. 16:2
